{"id":64376,"date":"2017-07-11T01:54:02","date_gmt":"2017-07-10T23:54:02","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/opinion\/the-long-unwinding-road-of-quantitative-easing\/"},"modified":"2019-12-31T02:02:22","modified_gmt":"2019-12-31T01:02:22","slug":"the-long-unwinding-road-of-quantitative-easing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/opinion\/the-long-unwinding-road-of-quantitative-easing\/","title":{"rendered":"The long unwinding road of quantitative easing"},"content":{"rendered":"<ul>\n<li> <em> <strong>Quantitative easing (QE) has resulted in heavily indebted developed economies and has had varying degrees of success.<\/li>\n<li> An unwinding of QE could cause increased volatility in the markets and a fight for remaining liquidity, as the supply of government bonds starts to disappear.<\/li>\n<li> QE has served its purpose of being a life raft for many of the largest economies and now central banks must start to go back towards the norm of pre-crisis levels, so that they have ammunition to tackle the inevitable next crisis.<\/strong> <\/em><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The reasons for using QE and its effectiveness<br \/>\nhave been argued at length and this article aims<br \/>\nnot to discuss whether or not QE has worked, but<br \/>\nto look at the likely next steps of central banks<br \/>\nand how these could impact markets.<\/p>\n<p>QE first reared its head in Japan in 2001, when<br \/>\nthe Bank of Japan (BoJ) became the first central<br \/>\nbank to purchase government bonds financed<br \/>\nby the creation of central bank reserves. This<br \/>\nhappened when the BoJ found itself backed into<br \/>\na corner as it approached the presupposed lower<br \/>\nbound for nominal interest rates and needed<br \/>\nto stimulate the economy. Following the global financial crisis, central banks in the US, UK and<br \/>\nEurope were forced to follow suit, pumping large<br \/>\namounts of money into the banking system to<br \/>\nprevent it from collapsing.<\/p>\n<p>These measures have caused an array of<br \/>\nconsequences (intended or otherwise) that will<br \/>\nneed to be addressed sooner or later. At its core,<br \/>\nQE has resulted in heavily indebted developed<br \/>\neconomies and has had varying degrees of<br \/>\nsuccess, which has arguably been dependent<br \/>\non the extent of distortions or frictions in the<br \/>\nfunctioning of various markets.[[http:\/\/www.bankofengland.co.uk\/research\/Documents\/workingpapers\/2016\/swp624.pdf]]\n<p><strong>FIGURE 1: CENTRAL BANK BALANCE SHEET SIZE RELATIVE TO NOMINAL GDP (LHS) AND GOVERNMENT DEBT (RHS) <\/strong><br \/>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/www.next-finance.net\/http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" class=\" aligncenter size-full wp-image-64370\" src=\"IMG\/jpg\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_.jpg\" alt=\"figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_.jpg\" align=\"center\" width=\"1201\" height=\"522\" \/><\/a><br \/>\nNow that we are a decade on since the start of the crisis, surely it is time to think about what happens<br \/>\nnext to QE. Despite a fairly uniform decision to undertake QE across developed markets, the methods<br \/>\nused have differed and so will the approaches to unwinding in the US, UK, Europe and Japan. The<br \/>\ngeneral market effects of QE have been lower discount rates, a weaker currency, and a strong<br \/>\nenvironment for risk assets. Bank of England (BoE) studies have also shown there to be strong positive<br \/>\ninternational spill-over effects of QE. Therefore, it is safe to assume that any rollback of QE would also<br \/>\nhave international impacts in such an interconnected world.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Are central banks maintaining their independence?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Before we get into the when and how, let us<br \/>\nfirst consider if QE even needs to be unwound.<br \/>\nArguably, if the debts held by central banks are<br \/>\ncontinually rolled over and the coupons on the<br \/>\ndebt are not required to be paid, then does the<br \/>\ndebt really exist?<\/p>\n<p>The idea of simply cancelling QE debt has been<br \/>\nbandied around and, although not economically<br \/>\ndifferent from central banks holding onto the<br \/>\nbonds and accumulating cash flows indefinitely,<br \/>\nmarkets would react very differently to these<br \/>\noptions. The budgetary implications of QE in<br \/>\nthe UK already correspond to a de facto debt<br \/>\ncancellation, but a de jure cancellation would<br \/>\nimpede the BoE\u2019s ability to resterilise the<br \/>\nmonetary base at some point in the future.<br \/>\nThis is something the former governor of the<br \/>\nBoE, Sir Mervyn King, has highlighted but<br \/>\nthe BoE in particular wanted to avoid, as by<br \/>\ndoing this it would suggest that central bank<br \/>\nindependence is not so independent after all.<br \/>\nAnnouncing debt cancellation would indicate that governments could indebt themselves without<br \/>\nreal consequences and could lead to consistent<br \/>\noverspending. As markets lose their faith in the<br \/>\nreliability of a country\u2019s intentions to fulfil debt<br \/>\nobligations, we could see inflation shoot up and<br \/>\nthe value of the country\u2019s currency plummet. As<br \/>\nwe all know, trust is fundamental to the efficient<br \/>\nfunctioning of markets \u2013 so which (if any) central<br \/>\nbank is brave enough to admit to taking this step?<\/p>\n<p>Consequently, could the rolling back of QE be<br \/>\nconsidered so much of an inconvenience that<br \/>\ncentral banks simply opt to keep it indefinitely on<br \/>\nthe balance sheets? This would certainly make<br \/>\nthose central bankers, already concerned by the<br \/>\nbloated balance sheets, uneasy as they face the<br \/>\nprospect of a new norm plagued by the threat of<br \/>\ninflation and a lesser set of tools at their disposal<br \/>\nin the event of the next crisis. Or perhaps there<br \/>\nwill be an attempt to gradually reduce the debt<br \/>\nwhile trying to avoid another taper tantrum? Let<br \/>\nus consider the likely options central banks could<br \/>\ntake around the world.<\/p>\n<p><strong>US<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>In the US, the Federal Reserve is arguably the<br \/>\nfurthest along in terms of starting down the<br \/>\npath to the old status quo. The last of QE was<br \/>\ncompleted in 2014, leaving the Fed with a portfolio<br \/>\nof US$4.5 trillion on its balance sheet, which it<br \/>\nhas since maintained at this level by rolling over<br \/>\nthe debt and reinvesting any principal. While the<br \/>\nFed considers its stance on when the balance<br \/>\nsheet can start to be reduced we have seen small<br \/>\nrate hikes. The \u2018softly softly\u2019 approach is very<br \/>\nmuch being taken with lots of hints being passed<br \/>\nto the markets so as not to spook them and<br \/>\ncause an event like the taper tantrum in 2013,<br \/>\nwhich led to a surge in US Treasury yields. That<br \/>\nevent is precisely the reason that Federal Reserve<br \/>\nChair Janet Yellen is delaying an unwind, as the<br \/>\ncentral bank wants to maintain a buffer to absorb<br \/>\neconomic shocks while the economy remains<br \/>\nseemingly fragile. <\/p>\n<p>As the Fed continues its gradual rate hiking we<br \/>\nare likely to start to see a tapering of balance<br \/>\nsheet reinvestment starting in 2018, with details<br \/>\nemerging over the forthcoming Federal Open<br \/>\nMarket Committee (FOMC) meetings. With the<br \/>\ncurrent shape of the portfolio on the Fed\u2019s<br \/>\nbalance sheet, if all the debt maturing is allowed<br \/>\nto roll off then there would be a sharp run off<br \/>\nin 2018, reducing until 2024 when this flattens<br \/>\nout. To avoid such a large shock to markets, the<br \/>\npath of the debt roll-off is much more likely to<br \/>\nbe smoothed as is indicated in Figure 2. In this<br \/>\nscenario, we would expect to see a small amount<br \/>\nof upward pressure at the long end of the curve of<br \/>\nbetween 15-30bps towards the end of 2018. The<br \/>\ntapered approach to debt roll-off would help the<br \/>\nFed maintain some flexibility to change its mind as<br \/>\nthe markets\u2019 reaction is observed.<\/p>\n<p><strong>FIGURE 2: FED\u2019S TREASURY PORTFOLIO <\/strong><br \/>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/www.next-finance.net\/http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" class=\" aligncenter size-full wp-image-64372\" src=\"IMG\/jpg\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio.jpg\" alt=\"figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio.jpg\" align=\"center\" width=\"1203\" height=\"562\" \/><\/a><br \/>\nFor now we should expect further gradual rate hikes, which may pause if the FOMC starts to normalise<br \/>\nthe balance sheet later this year on the back of more positive economic numbers (as hinted by Dudley<br \/>\nin a recent speech). Markets are yet to take Dudley\u2019s suggestion or any more drastic options seriously,<br \/>\nthough surely at some point this will have to change \u2013 if the US does not set the trend of rolling back<br \/>\nQE, what hope is there for the rest of the world? <\/p>\n<p><strong>UK<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The next obvious place to follow suit in the<br \/>\nunwinding of QE would have been the UK;<br \/>\nhowever, studies have shown that any unwind is<br \/>\ncurrently near impossible. This is because of the<br \/>\nlarge amount of QE banks have used to meet their<br \/>\nprescribed regulatory buffers. Any removal of this<br \/>\nmoney will leave financial institutions fighting over<br \/>\nremaining liquidity to avoid falling foul of these<br \/>\nregulations. The way around this is to reduce the<br \/>\namount required to be held in buffers, but it is<br \/>\nunlikely that central banks will want to take away<br \/>\nthat safety net.<\/p>\n<p>It is important to note that in the UK we can see<br \/>\nsome of the unintended consequences of QE,<br \/>\nwhich highlight the need to address the situation<br \/>\nbefore more irrevocable damage ensues. Firstly<br \/>\nthe housing market has been impacted by<br \/>\nartificially low rates inflating house prices as those<br \/>\nwith the means to put down large deposits invest.<br \/>\nBanks insist on larger deposits as a means of<br \/>\nidentifying individuals who will be able to continue<br \/>\nto service mortgages if interest rates increase,<br \/>\nwhich keeps the younger generations off the<br \/>\nhousing ladder for longer. This is compounded<br \/>\nby the fact that rent is going up, hindering those<br \/>\nsame younger generations from ever being able to<br \/>\nsave for a deposit. <\/p>\n<p>At the other end of the generational scale, there<br \/>\nare those whose defined pensions are at risk. The<br \/>\npresent value of long-term future-defined benefit<br \/>\npension liabilities has risen to the point that they<br \/>\nare mismatched with the pension assets that have<br \/>\nbeen boosted less by the lower rates and higher<br \/>\nasset prices. These issues are starting to wear<br \/>\nthin with the British public, so surely something<br \/>\nmust be done. Perhaps though, this is not yet<br \/>\nthe time for the BoE to make its move with the<br \/>\nuncertainty of Brexit on the horizon. Interest rates<br \/>\nwill most likely stay low (though small hikes could<br \/>\nbe possible) to attract Foreign Direct Investment,<br \/>\nwhich is so vital to the UK to finance its current<br \/>\naccount deficit. This does leave the country at<br \/>\nrisk of having minimal tools to use if another crisis<br \/>\nwere to take place. Maybe helicopter money or<br \/>\ndebt write-off are the next steps? In the UK, the<br \/>\nequivalent of around 30% of overall debt has, from<br \/>\na budgetary perspective, already been effectively<br \/>\ncancelled. So could it be argued that this might<br \/>\nnot be too much of a leap for the BoE?<\/p>\n<p><strong>Europe<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>2017 is all about politics in Europe with the<br \/>\nnumerous elections taking place. Markets have<br \/>\nbeen suspicious after the shock votes in 2016,<br \/>\nbut so far fears have been unfounded as the<br \/>\npopulism craze seems to be going out of fashion.<br \/>\nAlso, in spite of the election concerns, we are<br \/>\nseeing good economic numbers coming out of<br \/>\nEurope which could suggest that more QE is<br \/>\nless likely. Earlier this year Draghi stated that<br \/>\npolicymakers were now confident that they had<br \/>\nremoved the threat of a severe bout of deflation.<br \/>\nCouple this with a calmer political outlook and<br \/>\nwe are likely to see the ECB move towards a less<br \/>\nloose monetary stance.<\/p>\n<p>The first stage for Europe has been the signal<br \/>\nof the end of QE-infinity before an actual halt to<br \/>\nQE ? and then finally a roll-back much further<br \/>\ndown the line. So far, the ECB is around 80% of<br \/>\nthe way through the EUR2.28 trillion QE extension<br \/>\nwhich will be complete by the end of the year,<br \/>\nwith a complete end of QE (with the potential to<br \/>\nstart tapering) as soon as the end of 2018, as<br \/>\nthe ECB is quickly running out of eligible bonds<br \/>\nto buy. The ECB is the central bank most at risk,<br \/>\nas it owns a large proportion of government debt<br \/>\nof the multiple member states. This puts the<br \/>\nECB balance sheet at risk of default if there is a<br \/>\nfracturing of the European Union.<\/p>\n<p><strong>FIGURE 3: ECB QE PURCHASES BY TYPE AND COUNTRY<\/strong><br \/>\n<a href=\"http:\/\/www.next-finance.net\/http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" class=\" aligncenter size-full wp-image-64374\" src=\"IMG\/jpg\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country.jpg\" alt=\"figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country.jpg\" align=\"center\" width=\"837\" height=\"920\" \/><\/a><br \/>\nThe ECB has stated that it will be tapering first and then considering rate hikes, so we are unlikely to<br \/>\nsee any hikes until the end of 2018 at the earliest. Draghi has gone further by outlining four necessary<br \/>\nconditions for inflation to meet the price stability target before tapering can be considered. Inflation<br \/>\nmust be medium-term, durable (not just driven by base effects), self-sustained (not reliant on the<br \/>\nextraordinary monetary conditions) and broad-based across the eurozone. It may be some time before<br \/>\nthis comes to pass and, even if interest rates start moving at the end of next year, the balance sheet<br \/>\nstill won\u2019t shrink until 2020 or 2021.<\/p>\n<p><strong>What about Japan?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Japan was the first to use QE and the most likely<br \/>\nto keep meaningfully extending its balance sheet<br \/>\nbeyond 2017. In fact, Japan is potentially decades<br \/>\naway from its desired inflation target and, even<br \/>\nif it is reached, it will have to be sustained for<br \/>\na period of time before the idea of stopping QE<br \/>\ncan be fathomed. Being the guinea pig for QE<br \/>\nhas meant the BoJ has faced a great deal of<br \/>\ncriticism, including claims that it waited too long<br \/>\nto implement QE and tightened monetary policy<br \/>\ntoo quickly. For the unwinding of QE, maybe the<br \/>\nBoJ will wait for the Fed to move so they can learn<br \/>\nfrom its mistakes.<\/p>\n<p>An International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper<br \/>\nby Hiromi Yamaoka and Murtaza Syed called<br \/>\n\u2018Managing the Exit: Lessons from Japan\u2019s reversal<br \/>\nof Unconventional Monetary Policy\u2019 looked at what<br \/>\nwe can learn from the BoJ\u2019s first QE exit strategy.<br \/>\nThis paper found that the gradual and orderly way<br \/>\nin which the BoJ unwound QE in 2006, with clear<br \/>\nindications given to the market, did not result in<br \/>\nany obvious disruption to financial markets. <\/p>\n<p>This proved that \u201cit is possible to exit from a period<br \/>\nof QE in a smooth manner, without overshooting<br \/>\nof inflation, derailing economic recovery, or<br \/>\ndestabilizing financial markets.\u201d[[https:\/\/www.imf.org\/external\/pubs\/ft\/wp\/2010\/wp10114.pdf]]\n<p>Nevertheless,<br \/>\nwith the arrival of the global financial crisis the<br \/>\nBoJ was forced to enter another monetary easing<br \/>\nphase, having only raised rates back to 0.5%<br \/>\nleaving the exit incomplete and Japan with a<br \/>\npersistently weak pricing environment. It feels like<br \/>\nyears since \u2018normal\u2019 economic conditions have<br \/>\nbeen here in Japan \u2013 maybe they will surprise us<br \/>\nall and move first again?<div id='gallery-1' class='gallery galleryid-64376 gallery-columns-3 gallery-size-herald-lay-c1'><figure class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<div class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a class=\"herald-popup\" href='http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_.jpg'><img width=\"470\" height=\"313\" src=\"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_-470x313.jpg\" class=\"attachment-herald-lay-c1 size-herald-lay-c1\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" srcset=\"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_-470x313.jpg 470w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_-300x200.jpg 300w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_-414x276.jpg 414w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_-640x426.jpg 640w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_-130x86.jpg 130w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_1_-_central_bank_balance_sheet_size_relative_to_nominal_gdp_lhs_and_government_debt_rhs_-187x124.jpg 187w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 470px) 100vw, 470px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/div><\/figure><figure class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<div class='gallery-icon landscape'>\n\t\t\t\t<a class=\"herald-popup\" href='http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio.jpg'><img width=\"470\" height=\"313\" src=\"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio-470x313.jpg\" class=\"attachment-herald-lay-c1 size-herald-lay-c1\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" srcset=\"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio-470x313.jpg 470w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio-300x200.jpg 300w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio-414x276.jpg 414w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio-640x426.jpg 640w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio-130x86.jpg 130w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_2_-_fed_s_treasury_portfolio-187x124.jpg 187w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 470px) 100vw, 470px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/div><\/figure><figure class='gallery-item'>\n\t\t\t<div class='gallery-icon portrait'>\n\t\t\t\t<a class=\"herald-popup\" href='http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country.jpg'><img width=\"470\" height=\"313\" src=\"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-470x313.jpg\" class=\"attachment-herald-lay-c1 size-herald-lay-c1\" alt=\"\" loading=\"lazy\" srcset=\"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-470x313.jpg 470w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-837x556.jpg 837w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-300x200.jpg 300w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-414x276.jpg 414w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-640x426.jpg 640w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-130x86.jpg 130w, http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/07\/figure_3-ecb_qe_purchases_by_type_and_country-187x124.jpg 187w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 470px) 100vw, 470px\" \/><\/a>\n\t\t\t<\/div><\/figure>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>According to Mark Burgess, CIO EMEA and Global Head of Equities, Columbia Threadneedle Investments, an unwinding of QE could cause increased volatility in the markets and a fight for remaining liquidity, as the supply of government bonds starts to disappear.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":64370,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1480],"tags":[1655,2073,1943,1651,2214,2087,2148,1650,2068],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/64376"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=64376"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/64376\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":64377,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/64376\/revisions\/64377"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/64370"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=64376"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=64376"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=64376"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}