{"id":68167,"date":"2018-01-03T00:04:51","date_gmt":"2018-01-02T23:04:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/strategie\/asset-allocation-american-vertigo\/"},"modified":"2018-01-03T00:04:51","modified_gmt":"2018-01-02T23:04:51","slug":"asset-allocation-american-vertigo","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/strategie\/asset-allocation-american-vertigo\/","title":{"rendered":"Asset allocation: American vertigo"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>November\u2019s leading indicators show a fresh short-term<br \/>\nacceleration in the world economy beyond the 4%<br \/>\nmark. This growth pace is well above potential (3.5%) and<br \/>\nshould lead to renewed inflation and validate the<br \/>\ntougher stance on monetary policy across most<br \/>\ndeveloped markets. The economists\u2019 consensus is for a<br \/>\ngradual normalization in yield curves in the G7 under the<br \/>\ncautious leadership of central banks. Against this<br \/>\nbackdrop, our asset allocation remains resolutely<br \/>\noffensive, but includes some selective plays reflecting the<br \/>\nhighest risks (overvalued markets) and our doubts on the<br \/>\nlikelihood of a soft landing for global monetary expansion. <\/p>\n<p>It is worth remembering that the strong and synchronized<br \/>\ngrowth we are witnessing worldwide is the result of a<br \/>\nsuccessful adjustment by emerging markets after large<br \/>\ndevaluations in 2014-2015 (external adjustment, then<br \/>\ndisinflation and interest rate cuts, recovery in consumer<br \/>\nspending), Chinese banking stimulus in 2015, reasonable<br \/>\noil prices (US shale) and lastly, monetary abundance from<br \/>\nEurope and Japan, which is spilling over into the rest of<br \/>\nthe world via capital outflows by their institutional<br \/>\ninvestors. Yellen\u2019s Fed has admittedly implemented some<br \/>\nfaint-hearted monetary tightening, but capital inflows<br \/>\nhave fueled euphoria on US asset markets (equities, High<br \/>\nYield credit, real estate) to the extent that this has<br \/>\ncancelled out the effects of key rate hikes on financial<br \/>\nconditions. The strength of the global recovery<br \/>\nautomatically means a turnaround in all these factors. <\/p>\n<p><quote>The emergence of bubbles (real estate, bonds), which<br \/>\nthreaten social stability, has already forced China to put<br \/>\nthe brakes on bank liquidity.<\/quote><br \/>\n The consequences of this<br \/>\nshockwave have rippled out across the entire Pacific Ring<br \/>\nof Fire as we expected, with a contraction in the building<br \/>\nsector in China, a decline in commodities prices (coal, iron<br \/>\nore, industrial metals), a shift in real estate bubbles in<br \/>\nAustralia, New Zealand, Canada and the US West coast,<br \/>\nand a hit on exports in Peru and Chile. A number of large<br \/>\nemergings that seemed to be dragging themselves out of<br \/>\ntheir rut in 2017 could be hit by another recessionary<br \/>\nshock due to the drop in commodities prices (Brazil,<br \/>\nIndonesia, South Africa). Oil will also act as a recessionary<br \/>\nfactor for developed countries in 2018 if prices remain<br \/>\nabove $60 as OPEC hopes.<\/p>\n<p>Lastly, excessive monetary stimulus is almost spent out in<br \/>\nEurope and Japan. In the euro area, the ECB is coming<br \/>\nclose to the issue share limits it set itself to avoid accusations of monetization of public debt. Tapering of the<br \/>\nPSPP should come to an end in late 2018 in our view. In<br \/>\nJapan, the BoJ\u2019s monetary artillery (qualitative and<br \/>\nquantitative easing, negative interest rates and yield curve<br \/>\ncontrol) is running up against technical limitations (dryingup<br \/>\nof JGB liquidity, lack of equity ETF), the virtual<br \/>\ninsolvency of regional banks (flat yield curve), the risk of<br \/>\nbubbles (commercial real estate) and the likely return to<br \/>\npositive core inflation. We expect the 10-year yield target<br \/>\nto be raised from 0 to 0.15% in 1H, once US tax reform<br \/>\nhas been ratified. This will involve a fresh slowdown in JGB<br \/>\npurchases by the issuing institution. Synchronized<br \/>\ntapering by both the BoJ and the ECB should resteepen<br \/>\nthe yield curves in the euro area and Japan, with a knockon<br \/>\neffect for the US 10-year yield, as the G3 bond markets<br \/>\nare inter-connected. <\/p>\n<p>In the US, the stimulus provided by tax reform is set to be<br \/>\ndrowned out by a rise in inflation, a soaring trade deficit,<br \/>\nrate hikes from the Fed and the surge in the dollar. The<br \/>\nrise in long-term rates triggered by tapering in Japan and<br \/>\nEurope will dent valuations for both equities and real<br \/>\nestate. The shock on long-term rates should only be<br \/>\ntemporary as domestic long-term investors (insurers and<br \/>\npension funds) have already changed their marginal<br \/>\ninflows away from equities and into bonds (equity<br \/>\nweighting target reached as a result of market rally), and<br \/>\nthe increase in mortgage rates will soon dry up the source<br \/>\nof fixed-rate MBS issues. The combination of high rates<br \/>\nand rising budget deficit will particularly accentuate the<br \/>\nshortage of dollar-denominated liquidity across the rest of<br \/>\nthe world, which is already dented by Basel III, with the<br \/>\nrisk of triggering a short squeeze on emerging markets\u2019<br \/>\nexternal debt. This US policy mix profile harks back to the<br \/>\nReagan\/Volcker era, after which the Third World debt crisis<br \/>\nfollowed hot on the heels. <\/p>\n<p><quote>We maintain our overweight stance on risky assets via<br \/>\nequities in the euro area, Japan and emerging Asia, along<br \/>\nwith European credit (IG and HY) and European peripheral<br \/>\ndebt, but maintain our underweight position on assets<br \/>\nexposed to Chinese real estate risk and the dollar\u2019s rise<br \/>\n(emerging debt, Latin-American equities, industrial<br \/>\nmetals).<\/quote><br \/>\n Our currency positions (long USD vs. EUR, CHF,<br \/>\nAUD) are a telling reflection of our view of a world where<br \/>\nthe dollar\u2019s exchange rate has superseded the VIX as the<br \/>\nsynthetic risk aversion indicator. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>November\u2019s leading indicators show a fresh short-term<br \/>\nacceleration in the world economy beyond the 4%<br \/>\nmark. This growth pace is well above potential (3.5%) and<br \/>\nshould lead to renewed inflation and validate the<br \/>\ntougher stance on monetary policy across most<br \/>\ndeveloped markets.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":68165,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[1483],"tags":[1809,1655,1651,1807,2068,1678],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68167"}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=68167"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/68167\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/68165"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=68167"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=68167"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/beta.next-finance.net\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=68167"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}